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RECENT CASES

But, if the interpretation that has been placed on cases
involving constitutional offices is adopted, what would seem
to be the true intent of the drafters of the constitution and
the statutes will be given expression. The words "eligible
to the office," seem to mean precisely that, i.e., "eligible to
hold office." Construction of "eligible to the office" to
mean "eligible by election to the office," which is the construction adopted in the Bogard and in the instant cases, is
strained and seems unwarranted. Under the literal and
ordinary interpretation of the words, when an incumbent
had served for the maximum period, and his successor had
failed to qualify, a vacancy would exist to be filled by the
appointing authority. 6
LABOR LAW
AVAILABILITY OF LABOR INJUNCTION WHERE EMPLOYER FAILS TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS
OF INDIANA ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
A consent electioni held by the National Labor Relations Board determined Local No. 309, CIO, United Furniture Workers of America, as the majority representative
of the employees of the Smith Cabinet Manufacturing Co.
The Smith Co. refused to recognize Local No. 309 until it
had been certified as the majority representative by the
NLRB.2 The refusal led to picketing with accompanying
violence. 3 The Company petitioned the Daviess County Cir16.

See note 2 supra.

The consent election involved in the instant case was held a few
days prior to the effective date (August 22, 1947) of those sections of the Taft-Hartley Act making the filing of certain information pre-requisite to the availability of services of the NLRBincluding the holding of elections-to labor unions, but no official
certification had been made before the Sections became effective.
2. The NLRB could not officially certify Local No. 309 because the
union refused to comply with filing requirements. No investigation of a question concerning the representation of employees,
raised by a labor organization, can be entertained by the Board
unless certain information concerning the organization has been
filed and kept up to date by annual reports, and the officers of
the organization have filed non-communist affidavits. 61 STAT.
143, 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 f, g, h (Supp. 1947).
3. State police were called in to restore order. It is interesting to
note in this connection the case of Local No. 309, United Furniture Workers of America, CI0 v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N. D.
Ind. 1948). State police were attending union meetings held in
1.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

cuit Court for injunctive relief. After a hearing a temporary injunction was issued against some hundred persons
who were participating in the strike.4 There was no showing that the Smith Co. had complied with Section 85 of the
Indiana Anti-Injunction Statute which provides that no injunctive relief in a "labor dispute" shall be granted to any
complainant who has failed to make every reasonable effort
to settle such dispute by negotiation, mediation or voluntary
arbitration. On appeal from the decree granting the injunction, the strikers urged that Smith Co.'s failure to show
compliance with Section 8 barred its right to injunctive
relief. The Appellate Court of Indiana, relying upon an
interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act, held that there was
nothing to negotiate, mediate or arbitrate since the Smith
Co. was under no obligation to recognize Local No. 309 as
the bargaining agent in the absence of certification of the
Local by the NLRB; and that therefore it was unnecessary
to show compliance with Section 8 of the Indiana Anti-Injunction Statute. Fulford et al. v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co.,
77 N. E.2d 755 (Ind. App. 1948). (Bowen, J., dissented.) 6
The issue presented to the Indiana Appellate Court called
for a determination of whether th6 Indiana Anti-Injunction
Statute withheld jurisdiction to enjoin the strike. It was
the county court house. An injunction was granted prohibiting
this activity as being a deprivation of freedom of speech and assembly.
4. The wording of the injunction is not set out in this case but is
discussed in Local No. 309, United Furniture Workers of America,
CIO v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N. D. Ind. 1948). It restrained
the various individuals from mass picketing, from arming themselves while on the picket line, and from threatening with violence
any who wished to enter the Smith Co.'s premises.
5. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 40-508.
6. Presiding Judge Bowen points out that the Indiana Anti-Injunction
Act represents the firm legislative policy of the state on the
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. Section 8 of that Act
expressly provides that no injunction shall be issued unless the
complainant has made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute
by negotiation, mediation or arbitration. This provision is a
condition precedent to injunctive relief. The facts were undisputed that the Smith Co. had opportunity to negotiate, mediate
and arbitrate but did not do so. The Smith Co. had not fulfilled
the condition precedent. Therefore, "the action of the lower
court in granting this injunction was in direct conflict with
the legislative policy of this State and the provisions of the
statute.. . ." Fulford v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 77 N. E.2d 755,
757 (Ind. 1948). Further, "I fail to see how the Taft-Hartley
Act in any manner amends or nullifies the requirements of the
[Indiana Anti-Injunction Statute] setting forth the conditions
precedent to an employer's right to injunctive relief." Id. at .758
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conceded that there was a "labor dispute."T The trial court
had made the findings of fact. required by Section 7 of that
Act.8 It was conceded that the Smith Co. had made no effort
to negotiate, mediate or arbitrate. The question for the
court became: Under these circumstances-where a labor
union engages in mass picketing, cutting off ingress to the
plant; where pickets trespass on company property to arm
themselves with staves; where pickets use threatening
language and physical force; and where they cause damage
to and loss of property-was the employer required by Section 8 of the Indiana Anti-Injunction Statute to mediate,
negotiate or arbitrate before he was entitled to injunctive
relief?
Although this was the issue presented by the facts, it
was not faced by the court; rather, the decision was based
upon an interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act. Seizing upon
Local No: 309's failure to file certain information specified
by the Taft-Hartley Act, the court conceived the issue to be
whether such failure excused the Smith Co. from compliance
with Section 8.1 The majority held that Local No. 309's
failure did excuse compliance. It is to be noted that Local
No. 309 had no statutory duty to file with the NLRB. The
Taft-Hartley Act simply makes filing a condition to the
securing of the legal assistance of the NLRB. 1° Although
the court concerned itself primarily with an interpretation
of the Taft-Hartley Act, it nevertheless gave an implicit
7.
8.
9.

IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 40-513.
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 40-507.
The court in the instant case admitted the fact that before the
Taft-Hartley Act the employer would have had to comply with
Section 8. The question assumed by the court to be involved here
could not have risen under the Wagner Act as the union was not
required to meet any conditions to the right to services of the
Board. Under the Wagner Act compliance with Section 8 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was held not be a prerequisite to injunctive
relief where picketing was engaged in by a minority union. E.g.,
Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263 (N. D. Mo. 1937), aff'd,
96 F.2d 478 (C. C. A. 8th 1938); Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Union, 99 F.2d 309 (C. C. A. 8th 1938), cert. denied,
305 U. S. 662 (1939). Those cases are not persuasive in the
instant case, for in those cases a majority union had been certified
and it was the duty of an employer under the Wagner Act to
bargain exclusively with the certified representative. In the
instant case no union had been certified, and the Smith Co. was
under no.duty to bargain with another union so as to excuse noncompliance with Section 8.

10. See note 2 supra.
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answer to the real question at issue-the effect of violenceby holding that it was unnecessary to show compliance with
Section 8. In the light of the history of Section 8 and of
the decided cases this implicit decision is subject to criticism.
And the decision upon the assumed issue-the effect of the
Taft-Hartley Act-is open to serious question.
Although the problem presented by the Fulford case
was one of state law, involving a state statute, before a state
court, the history of Section 8 of the federal Norris-LaGuardia
Act11 is a primary aid in determining how Section 8 of the
Indiana Anti-Injunction Statute1 2 should be interpreted. The
state statute follows identically the wording of the federal
act, and was enacted, presumably for identical purposes, only
a year after the federal act became effective. The construction given the federal act is therefore applicable authority for construing the state statute. 13
Congressional reports on the Norris-LaGuardia Act
characterized Section 8 as a "clean hands" section.1 4 Very
generally, the equitable doctrine of clean hands is that he
who seeks relief must come into court free from reproach
in his conduct with respect to the subject matter of his
claim.1 5 And so, Section 8 requires that before a petitioner
for injunctive relief in a labor dispute is entitled to relief'
he must show that his hands are clean, i.e., that he has sought
diligently to settle the dispute by methods-mediation, negotiation and arbitration-short of recourse to the court. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has indicated by
way of dictum that under certain circumstances violence by
a defendant union may relieve an employer seeking an injunction from the necessity of complying with Section 8.
Whether the violence of the strikers in the Fulford case had
such an effect depends upon the principlees which the Supreme Court has suggested as guideposts. That Court6 in
denying an injunction in a case involving violence where an
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101 to 115 (1946).
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) §§ 40-501 to 515.
Roth v. Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E.2d 280 (1939).
75 CONG. REC. 5464 (1932).
This characterization was used in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321
U. S. 50 (1944).
2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (5th ed. 1941).
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 321
U. S. 50 (1944).
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employer had not complied with Section 8 stated that if
any exception to the Section's requirement is 'created by
employees' violence, it is "when the particular circumstances
show the complainant has had no opportunity to comply with
such requirements. .

."17

Reasoning that the purpose of

Section 8 is "to head off strikes and the violence which too
often accompanies them,"' 8 the Supreme Court would free
the employer of the necessity of compliance with the Section
only where he had no chance to avert the strike and its
violence, i.e., only when it was factually impossible to resort
to negotiation, arbitration or mediation. Under this test,
an employer could ask a court to enjoin violence where his
property suddenly and unexpectedly became the object of a
violent strike; his unawareness of the need to negotiate would
make impossible any attempt to head off the strike. But
Section 8 "was intended to apply when he had had ample opportunity [to comply with its terms] but refused to do so."' 19
In the Fulford case, violence did not precede the employees'
demand for negotiation; only after Smith Co. had refused
to negotiate did the employees resort to violence. Smith Co.
had ample opportunity to try "to head off" the strike by a
good faith attempt to negotiate. Therefore the violence
which attended its refusal to take advantage of its opportunity does not excuse its failure to comply with Section 8.
"There was indeed no expression of concern in Congress for
the complainant who, having full opportunity to comply with
the Section, might refuse deliberately and steadfastly to do
1 °
Thus both as a matter of equity principles and as a
sO. 2
matter of statutory interpretation, there is no authority for
the position that the violence of Local No. 309 would excuse
the Smith Co. from showing compliance with Section 8.21
If it be admitted that prior to the passage of the Taft17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 65.
Ibid.
Id. at 66.
Ibid.
Also to be noted in this connection is General Electric Co. v.
Gojack, 68 F. Supp. 686 (N. D. Ind. 1946) where findings were

made entitling the employer to an injunction under § 7 of the

Norris-LaGuardia Act concerning the threat of unlawful acts
and the unwillingness of the police to furnish adequate protection.
Judge Swygert held that even in the face of mass picketing § 8
of the Act must be complied with and refused to grant the injunction because an attempt at settlement had not been made.
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Hartley Act, the single fact of violence could not relieve an
employer of the obligation imposed by Section 8 of the State
Anti-Injunction Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it becomes material to determine whether the Taft-Hartley Act
can be interpreted so to relieve him. The Indiana Appellate
Court held that it could.
As an historical matter, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
193222 had deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to interfere by injunction with labor disputes except in a very
limited class of cases; and the Wagner Act of 193523 had
provided affirmative remedies for employees against certain
employer activities. It is said that the 80th Congress thought
that the legal armament which employees and labor organizations were able to muster as a result of such legislation (and
the administrative and judicial interpretation of it) had unbalanced the scales which weigh the legal power of labor
and management. Designed to bring the scales into balance
24
was the Taft-Hartley Act.
Because of this very purpose to equalize the power of
labor and management it is obvious that Congress in drafting the Taft-Hartley Act thoroughly considered all existing
labor-relations legislation and administrative and judicial
interpretation of such legislation. That it considered the
Wagner Act is demonstrated by the fact that the Taft-Hartley Act is built around that statute, retaining many of its
features.25 That Congress considered the Norris-LaGuardia
22. See note 11 supra.
23. 49 STAT. 449 to 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 to 166 (1946).
24. "To amend the National Labor Relations Act, . . . , to equalize
legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers, . . .
Be it enacted .... " 61 STAT. 136 to 161, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 141 to
197 (Supp. 1947).
25. E.g., The National Labor Relations Board is continued. 61 STAT.
139, 29 U. S. C. A. § 153 a (Supp. 1947). A distinctly new
unfair labor practice is coercion by a labor organization of employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act. 61 STAT.
140, 29 U .S. C. A. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1947). An NLRB
trial examiner investigating a charge growing out of the instant
case recommended to the Board that the union be found guilty
of "coercing employees" in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
It is not clear who filed the complaint leading to this investigation. Probably it was the employer. The recommendation of the
trial examiner was to become the final order of the Board if no
exceptions were filed within 20 days. No further disposition of
this investigation has been discovered. Smith Cabinet Manufacturing Co., 22 LAB, REL, REP. (Labor-Management) 3 (May 3,

1948),
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Act is clear from the fact that that statute was expressly
made inoperative in certain instances.26 And that the TaftHartley Act does not expressly relieve an employer from
complying with Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act where
that employer seeks an injunction against a union striking
for recognition as employee representative is obvious from
a reading of that statute.27 The question then becomes whether Congress implicitly abrogated the application of Section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in such a situation.1 This
is the question answered in the affirmative by the Fulford
case.
But Senator Taft, in commenting upon the Taft-Hartley
Act, said: "It does not increase in any way the right of an
individual employer to injunctive relief free from the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."29 Nor have the courts
26.

One notable instance is where the Board makes application to the
courts for appropriate relief in conjunction with cases pending
before it. 61 STAT. 146, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160 h (Supp. 1947).
Further, the Attorney Geenral acting at the direction of the
President can in case of an emergency secure an injunction without complying with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 61 STAT. 155, 29
U. S. C. A. § 178 b (Supp. 1947). When granting injunctions in
cases dealing with the violation of restrictions on employer payments to employee representatives the courts are not bound by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 61 STAT. 157, 29 U. S. C. A. § 186 e
(Supp. 1947).
27. It is an unfair labor practice to strike with the object of forcing
another employer to bargain with an uncertified labor organization. 61 STAT. 140, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (b) (4) (B) (Supp.
1947). It is to be noted that this does not include the activity
in the instant case, but only activity in the nature of a secondary
boycott. As said in the Senate Report: "It is to be observed that
the primary strike for recognition (without a Board certification)
is not proscribed." SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22
(1947). A primary strike to force any employer to recognize a
labor organization if another labor organization has already been
certified is an unfair practice under 61 STAT. 140, 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 158 (b) (4) (C) (Supp. 1947). No prior certification was involved in the instant case.
28. The Indiana Anti-Injunction Act should be construed the same
as the Federal Norris-LaGuardia Act. Roth v. Retail Clerks
In construing the
Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E.2d 280 (1939).
operation of the Taft-Hartley Act the court must find its intended
effect on the Norris-LaGuardia Act in order to determine how
federal courts should interpret the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the
future. Having found the intended interpretation, and having
determined that Indiana's Anti-Injunction Act is to be interpreted the same way, it follows that the intended effect on the
Norris-LaGuardia Act became material to the effect on the Indiana
Act.

29. Taft, The Taft-Hartley Act, What It Does Do, What It Does Not
Do. 15 L C. C. PaAC. J. 466 (1948).
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found implicit in the Taft-Hartley Act any effect upon the
employers' injunctive remedies, restricted by the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Relief at the behest of an individual has
been denied in both federal 0 and state31 courts when the
right of an individual to sue for an injunction has not been
created by clear words of the Taft-Hartley Act. It may
be concluded that under the Fulford facts not only does
the Taft-Hartley Act not require the nullification of Section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the Indiana Anti-Injunction Statute; thre is explicit authority that that interpretation was not intended. 2
Quite probably the decision in the Fulford case may be
explained by the extreme violence which attended the strike
involved. The appellate court, very properly deploring the
strikers' invasion of the public peace, 33 may have felt that
30. Amazon Cotton Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183
(C. C. A. 4th 1948).
31. Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 194 P.2d 689 (Calif. 1948).
82. The reasoning of the majority in reaching their conclusion is
invalid upon more technical legal grounds also. One basis of the
court's decision in the Fulford case is founded upon a consideration
of what the result would be if the Smith Co. were required to
comply with Section 8 of the State Anti-Injunction Act. The
court apparently was troubled by the thought that even if the
Smith Co. had negotiated with Local No. 809 the parties would
not have settled the dispute unless one acceded completely to the
other's demand. Having decided that it was a legal privilege
of the Smith Co. to refuse to recognize Local No. 309 as the
bargaining representative in the absence of official certification,
and that the Smith Co. could not be compelled by law to give up
this privilege, the court concluded that there was nothing to
mediate, negotiate or arbitrate and hence that Section 8 was
necessarily inoperative. But the Smith Co. could have voluntarily
given up its legal privilege to refuse to recognize Local No. 309.
Section 9 of the Taft-Hartley Law, "Representatives and Elections," 61 STAT. 143, 29 U. S. C. A. 159 (Supp. 1947), does not
forbid an employer's recognizing a union as majority representative
without an election or certification. Section 9 provides procedures
for determining the majority representative when that question
cannot be agreed upon voluntarily. Evidence of this in the statute
is that Section 9 (a) speaks of "representatives designated or
selected for purposes of collective bargaining. [Emphasis added]
And Section 9 (c) (1) (A) requires that a petition for a Board
investigation of a question of representation contain an allegation that the employer declines to recognize the representative
in whose behalf the petition if filed. Thus the Taft-Hartley Act
clearly recognizes that parties may agree voluntarily upon who
the labor representative is to be. Contrary to the court's reasoning therefore, what the parties could voluntarily have agreed
upon was a subject for mediation, negotiation or arbitration.
88. Courts are likely to issue injunctions on less substantial grounds
if violence or threats are present. See e.g., Duplex Printing Co. v.
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an injunction was called for at any cost and that its interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act was the only available
path to that result. It may be suggested that other paths
were not closed. Had the court faced the question of whether Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and of the
Indiana Anti-Injunction Statute rendered it powerless to
enjoin violence no matter how extreme and no matter what
the cost to the public order, it might legitimately have determined that the statute intended no such result.3

4

A court is

within its proper sphere when it interprets a statute in the
light of the facts before it. It is a tenable position to assert
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the State Anti-Injunction Statute are concerned primarily with the rights of employers and employees and that only so long as no serious
public interest is involved must their provisions be rigidly
adhered to. Without here attempting to draw lines it may
be suggested that it is consonant with the purposes of the
statutes for a court to use its injunctive power to enjoin
violence on the part of the strikers when that violence
reaches dimensions which threaten not merely an employer
but an entire community.3 5 Such an interpretation of the
statutes would achieve the result at which the legislators
aimed; the use of the injunction simply as a strike-breaking
weapon would still be prohibited.3
But Section 8 would
not stand as a bar to the protection of society if such protection became imperative.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S.

312 (1921).

34.

See, NLRB v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939), where the

employees would have been entitled to reinstatement but for the vio-

lence involved in the case. The Supreme Court was influenced by

the presence of violence to hold that the statute did not intend that

employees should have the rights they might otherwise be en-

titled to in such circumstances.
35.

36.

To construe a state anti-injunction statute to prohibit injunctive
relief where violence is present might make the statute unconstitutional as a deprivation of the state's power to enjoin dangerous
activity. See Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees

Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 156, 22 N. E.2d 320, 322 (N. Y. 1939).
Cf. Judge Amidon's classic discussion of the abuses of the labor

injunction and his formulation of an injunction in the light of

the facts so as not to allow it to be simply a strike-breaking measure.

Great Northern R. Co. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (D. C. N.

Dak, 1923).

